Habeas Corpus Committee - Press Briefing by Powell, Lewis F., Jr
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons
Habeas Corpus Committee Powell Papers
9-21-1989
Habeas Corpus Committee - Press Briefing
Lewis F. Powell Jr
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/habeascorpus
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons




ADM1NISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 





September 15, 1989 
David Sellers, Public Information Officer~ 
Judicial Conference Media Arrangements 
Hugh Pate, Law Clerk to Justice Kennedy 
~
As per our telephone conversation of September 15, 1989, the 
f ~ s have been made with regard to media and the 
upcoming meeting of the Judicial Conference of the United States. 
Early next week the press will be informed that Justice 
Powell w-ill be announcing the report of the Habeas Corpus 
Committee at a Se tember 21 briefing in the Supreme Court 
Lawyers' Lounge. I t is my un erstanding that you are in the 
process of prepari ng a statement for Justice Powell. We will 
supply you with Judicial Conference letterhead. Please provide us 
with a _ copy of the stateme~t so we can 1ncorporate it in the 
package to be released Thursday. Keep in mind that the media may 
not be up to speed 6n this somewhat technical issue. 
. . W~dnesday night we will make final change·s in the , press . 
release to reflect final action taken by the Conference. As we 
.discussed, a draft press release will be delivered to you later 
t6day. ~ . . . . 
Thursdah morning at 9 a.m. the report of the Habeas Corpus 
Committee wi Be r eTeasea t6 the media embargoed to 10 a.m. 
Shortly before 10 a.m. I will tell the reporters assembled in the 
Lawyers' Lounge that Justice Powell has a brief statement to make 
concerning the report, o f ""tl're Baoeas Corpus Commi ttee, and that he 
will accept questions relating only to this issue. At 10 a.m. 
Justice Powell will enter the room and make his statement. I 
suggest that he take about ten minutes of questions. We should 
decide before hand whether he would like someone to step in after 
ten minutes to indicate that there will be one final question ~ or 
whether he would like to end the questioning himself. 
When Justice Powell has concluded his appearance, he should 
return to chambers. Either you or AO General Counsel Bill 
Burchill may like to remain in case additional question regarding 
the report are raised. I then will inform the media of any other 
action taken by the Judicial Conference and distribute the press 
release and other relevant handouts. For those who did not attend 
the briefing, the press release and copies of Justice Powell's 





~ ~ \ 
outlets that are on a list maintained by my off;ce. Copies also 
will be made available through Toni House's offi ce. 
C-SPAN is undergoing some renovations of i i s studios, and 
will arraiige'for the interview to take place eith er in a 
conferen~e room in their building (444 N. Capitol St., NW), or in 
a suitable room at the Court. You and I will acca pany Justice 
Powell to the interview. The precise location wil be finalized 
on Monday. The interview will begin at 1: 0 a. and last 20 
minutes. It is reque at i e Powe eport to the 
designated location at 11:20 a.m. The interview will be conducted 
by Connie Doebele, who is the station's expert on the courts and 
has interviewed Justice Powell in the past. She will limit her 
questions to the Habeas Corpus Committee report. 
C-SPAN will supply Justice Powell with a complimentary tape 
of his interview. The interview is tentatively scheduled to air 
Thursday night and then again over the weekend. We will be given 
the exact times next week. 
I will update you as these plans are finalized. Please do 
not hesitate to call me at 633-6040, if you have any questions. 




MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From Toni House 
September 18, 1989 
Re: Arrangements for Your Press Briefing 
~M~s~~ 
This memorandum is to confirm our discussio'R-rhis morning 
regarding the arrangements for your press bri~fin~ --The briefing is scheduled to take place at 10 a.m. in the 
EmP.loyees Conference Room, G-1. I will arrive in your chambers a 
few minu es efore 10 and wal'K down to the briefing with you. 
David Sellers, my counterpart at the Administrative Office, will 
already be in G-1, and will have advised the reporters to limit 
~ questions to the contents of the committee report. 
~.r. ~ plan to duplicate the committee report, embargoed for 
v-~lease at 10 a.m., and provide copies to interested reporters an /IJ/fJl'i 
r9 ~ jr Mlour in advance, so they should b e prepared to ask informed 
~1,--1 q ~ 
~ Aµ I understand from David that Hugh Pate is drafting a prepared 
c;,v;:,:-. statement for you. I know the press would find it helpful to 
~/" have a copy of an such statement, at least by the time you tW• de~ r 1, no · a vance. 
~J~k I suggest you take questions for 10 to 15 minutes -- as long 
~v- as it takes to satisfy all legitimate queries. I will be on hand 
~-v/ _;to "rescue" you, should that event appear necessary. At the 
~fbriefing : s conclusion, I'll walk back ~ tairs with you. 
~
~ erning your interview wi~ pan: Connie Doebele has 
asked that it be conducted somewh re he in at the Court. &-JI 
C-Span's studio istorfi'tip for reno ions. I recommena the '-> 
Employees Conference Room. In addition to the desk, there is a 
conference table and two comfortable chairs, so you have your 
choice of settings. 
C~ Sh~ . 
The l\1nt erv1ew is set for 11:30 a.m. Connie would appreciate // •Q 
your arriving about 11:20_ to test voice-levels, etc. Either ' L-
David or I will come "Eo chambers to pick you up. p-/l1--
Please let me know if these arrangements are not 
satisfactory. And thank you for your gracious cooperation. 
cc: Hugh Pate 
David Sellers ? ' 
- - ~--- .,, • -.,a, .-.-.,,;;,,: 
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' . ., 
Prom my atu~y that I mtnt1oned to rou on the phone, I 
ha,11 •ome seriou-s concerns about the propo•al of the 
Committee. ror your information I ~m transmitting a brie! 
memorandum which outlines these thoughts. 
I I ~ I ' 
ror -the reason• explained therein,? will not be able 
to join in the report reeommending the atatutory change 
proposed by the Committee. 
. 
It was gooa to vi•it w1,h fOU ana I iook fotward to 




"' ....... ,. 
J 
8 202 535 0350 C 1 ROBl~ 
. 
S(P.18 '8' t4t S.S HOLL~, OUEF' JUDGE, ilin'H CI.RC 
"'-:,,4,g,o-., .. _,._. 
P.'2 
Wit~ full dafar1nce to th• atu41oua eftorts an4 ~h• proposal 
of th• A4 aoc C~mmittee on Federal Habeas Corpu• in capital Ca111, 
w• muat respectfully 41119~•• with ~h• R•port. ~he committee has 
cbviously given thorough and exhauatlve consideration to many 
ftcb1ems in the operation c! the habea1 statutes. Theit 
commendable conoerna abo~t th• adequacy ~! representation ot 
indigent ~eath row defendants are particularly manifest in thl 
innovative au9gestiona in the Report. 
We, neverthele11, first must express our speoial objection to 
proposed Section 2257(c)(3) of !itle 28. Th•t lijbsection would 
depriv• a federal habeaa court o! any authority to isau• a stay ot 
' ~xecution or any hab1a1 relief even though the court•• con!14ende 
in the determination o! the sentene~t ta impose a penalty of death 
la undermined by a 1howin9 based on a fac~ual predicate that could 
not have been discovered earlier throu~h the exerciae of 
reaaonable diligenc• in time to present the c1alm far atate or 
t1deral ~oat-conviotion review, CQcond, we likewiee have serious 
concern• about the aix-moftth time bar imposed by proposed I 22sa. 
Thia mech•nical time-bar runs cou~ter to established equita~le 
principles whioh have traditionally he1n applied with respect to 
the Great Writ. 
I 
~h• coaunltt•• concludes that it there la any doubt about the 
11ntenclng ph•se ot a CApital caae, it should be raised during a 
stat• priso~er•• initial attempt to obtain post~eonviction revle~. 
O! course, repetitive hab@as proceedings thould be ~voided and it 
11 desirable that a11 claims challengin9 both the determination of 
1 
a 202 ~ 0350 C J ROB 1~ 
. 
SEP.11'8914:16 t-0.L~V, 04IET JUDGt, 19™ ClRC 
09/18/89 15:28 003 
P.Gi 
9ullt an4 t~• aentertc1 ba aaaetted in the very •arlieat Ph••• of 
any direct appeal ot peat-conviction proceedings. N,vertheless, 
•• noted below, there have been numerou1 instance• where the 
. !aotual predicate for• 1ub1tantial conetitutional claim eoul4 not 
be diacovered earlier, despite the exercise o! reason•ble 
dl11~ence. It ia for thla compelling teason that the Committee 
ha• w11ely provided in ptoposed Section 22S7(2) tor the asaertion 
of claim. of violation of the Constit~tion or law• ct the Unit•~ 
State• for relief from a gu11ty verdict where, such claims are 
baae4 on a factual predlo&te that ~Quld not hive been discovered 
thtough the ex1rcise ot r•asonable d111~ertce in time for state or 
federal post-conviction tevi•~• Nevertheless, section 2257(3) 
would deny any reliet wh•re only the death sentence and not the 
guilty verdict, ls undermined by auch a ahowin9. 
Brady_v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), h•ld that "the 
1uppre11lon by the prosecution of evidence favot4ble to an accused 
upon r1quest vlolites du1 process where the tY1denee la material 
either to 1ullt cs.to punis~ment, irrespective of the good faith 
or bad faith of the prosecution." (Emphasi• ~dded). ~ ~, 
United Statea v. Aqur1, 42? U.S. g7 (1976). Thus the 
constitutional rule clearly calla for relief in circumstanoea 
~here the exttema p~nalty itself is thrown in doubt, even though 
the conviction may not be so undermined. Io the m•r~in we note a 
nUD1ber o! caa~a wtuu•• r-nu,-t,• "'•"• ""••" a0ftl.p•11•• llo ••~ Qol4c 
judgment• in crimlna1 ca~ea because of Brady violations, 1 ana 
l 
See,~, ~lie v. Onltod Stattl, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); 
Onltedlt~1es v. offa, 437 r.2d 11 l!tn Cir. 1971), cert. desJed·, 
402 U.S. 9 8 (1971), Bowen v. Maynatd, 799 7.2d 593 ·(10th 1r.) 
etrt. ~,t!'led, ,19 u.s. 962 (l986)1Unite6,States ea.rel. Thampson 
(Footn0tt continue on n~xt Daae\ 
a . 
SEP.18 '8' 14117 ..a.La.JAY, CHIE:F' ~• 10TH CIRC P.04 
several o! th1m have been cas,1 where a dqath penalty alone w11 
undermint4,2 
In cirQumstancea where the p•nalty determln•tion •lone is 
thus akew•~, we ~ust v1~orouslv di•aqree with the Rap~~,•• 
recomme~dation to deny 111 authority to the federal cquits to 
1rant ~9liet ln au~aequent post•;onvicti0n proeeedln~a. Denial of 
relief whare newly dlacovered m1t1iating eviewnce could be shown 
would tu~ directly counter to the principle that •the 11ntertc•r in 
sa»ital casts mu•~ b~t. . ,R.fJ'.tni t t ed· to_ . cOl'l$ider a_nx relevant ------. 
m,itigating.~actor ••• •" Edding1 v. Q~lahorna, 455 U.S. 104, 112 
(1982) (emphasis ~dde4)1 w ~lsQ ~enry v. Lynaugh,_ U.S._, 
109 s.ct. 2934, 29461 57 o. s. ~. w. 4958, 4962 (1989) . (citing 
JOdings and its p?inclpl• that "a sentancer may not ba precludtd 
fr0m considering a~d may not refuse to consi~er •ny r•levant 
mitigating ~videnoe ottered bf the defandant 1s the ba• i • tor & 
1entence less than death.•). 3 Where a Brady violation occurs and 
r,eulte in the 1uppresslon of mitigating ev!dence, or evidence 
undermining an •~gravatln9 circumat1nce, the extreme penalty would 
875 
% 
!I.!,, h!i.!., Chaney v, B,own, 730 F.2d 1334, 1358 (l0ch Cir. 
1984), pertL- denied,~&§ O.s. 1090 (1984)1 United state, ex relL 
Almtj~a v. Bald!, 1§5 P.2d 815, e1g-a20 (3rd Cir, 1952), cerL_ 
!•~ e, 345 U.S. 904 (l953)J Orndorr v. Lockhar, 707 P, Supp. 
l062 (E.D. Ark. 1988) I iohards • P or t 546 So. 2d 1037 ( l'la • . 
1989) J n½;htbol!rne Y, , Uiger, NOi. 73609, 736:12, slip op. (!'la. 
'1Ul)' 20, 1§), 
3 
See ,t;2• Dutton v. Br~~, 812 F.2d 5g3 (10th Cir. 1987) (en 
b•no), cer deniti,4, _ u •• 
3
, 108 S.Ct. 116 (1~87). 
I 202 535 0350 C J ROB 1 ~ 09/HV89 15 r 29 005 
• · · . se,:.18 '89 14117 HOt.La.Rf, CHIEF JUDGE, 10TH ClRC 
P,05 
b•· cair1ed out in violation of th1 ptln~iple of ltady that due 
proc111 1a den1e4 where suppreeee4 evid1no• go•e to guilt gI. 
punishment, and o! !~Aings, which ~uatanteea that ill. mitigating 
evidence muat be cone1dered. 
It would al10 b• distrc11in; for ttliee to be unavailable 
wh•r• • death p•nalty is o~tain• d in violation of Napue v~ 
Illinois, 360 U.I, 264, 251 (1959), which recognlzea that "it 11 
e1tabllshe4 that a conviction obtained through use of false 
evideftee, known to be auch by cepre~• htat1ve5 ot the State, must 
fall under the rourteenth Amendment, •• •" ~ !.112 Gi9li0 v. 
United State(, 405 u.s. 150, 154~5S (1972) (undiaclosad proml~Q ot 
leniency mAde to key proa1cution witness in return !or hi• 
te1tlmony violates d~• precess requlremantt enunciated in Napu1)1 
I 
Miller v. Pate, 3SS c.s. 1 (19S7) (prosecution's delibar~te uee of 
false •vidence not discovered until aecond habeas proceedin; 
commenced), Again, both §la!y vlol&t1ons and liapu viclati0n,, 
first established by later diacovered evidence, are caae1 where a 
OO~•titutional claim challengin~ the sentence alone could not be 
heard by a federal h~b111 court if the proposal ot sectioA 2~S? 
ware adopted. 4 
4 
.. 
. .... I 202 535 0350 C 1 ROBJNSO-l • 
sa'.18 '89 14: 18 HOLL~, OUU llJDGE, 1BTH CIRC 
11 
09/18/99 15:29 006 
P.06 
We must al• o express out concern a• to the des1rabi11t1 of 
the propose4 six-month pe:iod 1n which t~• ~•daral habeas petition 
mu,t be !11•4• Although 1mplernentat~on 0t thla limitation 1• 
f•o1litate4 by the provision for counael an4 the carefully dtatt1d 
to111n~ prov1•1o~A, th• filing p • rlad itself nevertheless remains 
a ri~i~ 11m1t6ticn. such a mec~anlcal provision 11 not in harmony 
with the regatd f~r the Gt~at Writ whlch "ha• tr~~ltionally been 
. 
reg4rded aa governed by equitable princlples. 11 Fay v 1 Noia, 372 
u.1. 391, 438 (1963) (citing ynited Statea ex rel Smith v. Bald!, 
S44 u.a. 561, 573 (1953) (trankfurter, 3., d1seentin9)), 
Co~•i•tently with auch equitable pr1nclple •, Rule 9 of the aules 
Covernlng Babeaa Corpua Petition• under 28 o.s.c. S 2254 alreadt 
~rov!des protection for the atate1 againat prejudice reeulting 
trom the •as•~tl~n ot untimely or •~cc••sive p~titiona. Thia 
I 
ralief 1eems adequate and consistent with the histo,y ot the writ. 
0~• e~tremely diaturbinQ Aituation must ba noted rel1t1d to 
the time bar proposed, If a defendant under• ~eath sentence were· 
denle4 requested and properly admissible Bt•~v material t~at 
1tron9ly su~ported a miti~ating circumatance or •ariously 
undermined an •i9ravatin9 circ~matanee, an~ 1: that evidence was. 
not diaoo~et•d within the 180 day time bar of S 2258, then a 
federal court would b• powerless u~dar s 225? to grant a stay or . 
any habeas teliet a9ainst a seric~1ly que1tion«ble death aantence. 
It tl\e evidenoe did not relate to tha ~ullty verdict no rtliet 
would b• po••ible. It 11 • diatreasing contrad1ot1on that 
ata~ut•• of 11m1tAtion1 in cl~il c•1es have tollin9 exceptions. 
~hat permit one to 111,rt a claim to recover his ptop,rty when a 
wront eoncealed by fraud 11 discovtted, and yet under th• ~roooaed-
D 
C:t:k! ~ ~ l,; J l(LJ.t:! 1 l'bl..N 09/18/89 15:29 
• 




habtas~tatu~• ane te•kln~ to••~ a• ld• hi • death • enteno• on th• 
g~ound ot a Qonatitutional viol•tion undetmlning the aentenee 
alone would b• denied rel1tf, al~hough his v1ry life ia at stake, 
We mu1t, therefore, respectfully disagree with the 
Committ••'• report and cannot join 1n recommending au~h statutory 












September 19, 1989 
Probable Questions on Habeas Proposal 
1. Constitutionality: Habeas corpus for state prison-
ers is not mentioned in the Constitution at all. It did not 
exist until Congress created it by statute in 1867, and Con-
gress is free to alter §2254. Of course, at the time of the 
adoption of the Constitution, it was left to Congress to 
decide whether there should even be lower federal courts at 
all, much less whether habeas relief should be available if 
the courts were created. 
Even if the Suspension Clause did apply, the relatively 
minor limits on habeas proposed here could never be termed a 
"suspension." The Court has made clear in Swain v. 
Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977), that the Constitution could 
only be implicated if prisoners were limited to an "inade-
quate and ineffective" remedy. rt cannot reasonably bear-
gued that one full course of state and federal habeas review 
with a state-provided lawyer and an automatic stay of execu-
tion is "inadequate and ineffective." 
2. Statute of Limitations: The 180-day period is not 
unnecessarily short. The 180 days represents only time when 





only when a lawyer is appointed. There is a provision for a 
60-day extension when necessary. In view of the fact that 
the prisoner will have assistance of counsel, and that his 
federal court claims must have already been presented in 
state court, the time is ample. Note that the 6-month peri-
od is far longer than afforded for taking any type of state 
or federal appeal . 
3. Factual Innocence: The limitation of subsequent 
and successive petitions under §2257(c) to claims of factual 
innocence of the crime itself is vital to enhancing finality 
in capital litigation. To allow challenges to the sentence 
as well would gut the proposal. The so-called discovery of 
"new" mi ti gating evidence about the defendant's background 
is the single most frequent claim in last-minute habeas pe-
titions. Unlike evidence about the crime, which turns on 
historical fact, mitigating evidence can be literally any-
thing, including psychiatric speculation or some newly re-
Such evidence membered fact about the prisoner's childhood. 
is easily manufactured, often with the help of so-called 
"expert" psychiatric witnesses. The Committee does not be-
lieve that entertaining these repeated claims enhances fair-
ness. It only contributes to delay. Our proposal gives the 
prisoner counsel and an automatic stay for one full course 
of review. It is fair to require any challenge to the sen-





crime is at issue, the proposal of course provides an excep-
tion. 
4. Reduction of Delay: The proposal is not certain to 
reduce "delay" as a whole, because it cannot affect the time 
spent while a case is actually being reviewed by a court. 
Rather, the proposal only attempts to limit the amount of 
"down time" -- time during which judicial review is not pro-
ceeding at all. There is now no incentive to move review 
forward until an execution date is set. It should be empha-
sized that reduction of delay is not the only function of 
the proposal. It also seeks to enhance fairness and to 
eliminate chaotic, time-pressured, last-minute litigation. 
5 . Separate Procedures for Capital Cases: Separate 
procedures are justified by the different incentives of cap-
ital and non-capital prisoners. Prisoners serving a term of 
years have every incentive to seek judicial review as soon 
as possible. The capital inmate's incentive is just the 
opposite -- delay in any way possible. 
6. Standards for Competency: The Committee believes 
that the proposal will be more attractive to the States if 
the standards for appointing counsel are flexible. Differ-
ent States may need different schemes for qualification and 





program as a whole is a federal question subject to review 
by a federal court. 
7 . Ineffective Assistance Claims: Ineffective assist-
ance of habeas counsel is not itself a ground for relief 
under the proposal, and should not be. The Constitution 
does not provide any right to counsel on post-conviction 
review. Murray v. Giarratano. The Commit tee did not be-
lieve creation of such a new right to effective assistance 
was appropriate. This would open a new ground for collater-
al litigation and delay. The competency of counsel is best 
addressed in the State's system for appointment, not in in-














Justice Powell September 19, 1989 
Hew 
Probable Questions on Habeas Proposal 
1. Constitutionality: Habeas corpus for s..,t a},..e prison- ~,/-
==--
ers is not mentioned in the Constitution at all. It did not ~ 
exist until Congress created it by statute in 1867, and Con- 4i ~I-_ 
gress is free to alter §2254. Of course, at the time of the 
adoption of the Constitution, it was left to Congress to 
decide whether there should even be lower federal courts at 
all, much less whether habeas relief should be available if 
the courts were created. 
Jl \\ C 
Even if the Suspension Clause did apply, the relatively ~ c..-t, 
minor limits on habeas proposed here could never be termed ~ 
-<--r-t-:.. 
"suspension." The Court has made clear in Swain v.lAA..~.,/J. 
Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 ( 1977), that the Constitution could hA!> •~ _ 
--. 
only be implicated if prisoners 
quate and ineffective" remedy. 
were limited to an "inade-~
~ 1,d ff/L 
It cannot reasonably bear-~ . 
gued that one full course of state and federal habeas review 
with a state-provided lawyer and an automatic stay of execu-
tion is "inadequate and ineffective." 
2 • Statute of Limitations: The 180-day period is not 
unnecessarily short. The 180 days represents only time when ---- -





only when a lawyer is appointed. There is a provision for a 
60-day extension when necessary. In view of the fact that 
the prisoner will have assistance of counsel, and that his 
federal court claims must have already been presented in 
state court, the time is ample. Note that the 6-month peri- I 
od is far longer than afforded for taking any type of state r 
or federal appeal. 
and 
3. Factual Innocence: The limitation of subsequent 
II 
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the defendant's background 4r/ 1-1,...,,c.. -"new" mitigating evidence about 




titians. Unlike evidence about the crime, which turns on ~-1-~ 
,, 
historical fact, 'lmitigating evidence can be literally any-




11,...,_ membered fact about the prisoner's childhood. Such evidence 
1~" 
is easily manufactured, often with the help of so-called ~ - ' 
"expert" psychiatric witnesses. The Committee does not be- ,~~~, dL ,, 
lieve that entertaining these repeated claims enhances fair- ~~~ 
. . ~ dd..t. .,,.,,,, 
ness. It only contributes to delay. Our proposal gives the 
prisoner counsel and an automatic fl~ for one full course 
of review. It is fair to require ~any challenge __!.o ~he sen-
. --~ ~=cz:.w- -= 
tence to be raised ~~~e. Where innocence of the 






crime is at issue, the proposal of course provides an excep-
tion. 
4. Reduction of Delay: The proposal is not certain to 
reduce "delay" as a whole, because it cannot affect the time 
spent while a case is actually being reviewed by a court. 
Rather, the proposal only attempts to limit the amount of 
"down time'' -- time during which judicial review is not pro-
ceeding at al 1. There is now no incentive to move review - --::-----:-
forward until an execution date is set. It should be empha-
sized that reduction of delay is not the only function of 
the proposal. It also seeks to 
eliminate chaotic, time-pressured, 
enhance fairness and to f ~ 
last-minute litigation. ~ 
./...-u~~ ,~ 
5 • Separate Procedures for Capital Cases: Separate 
procedures are justified by the different incentives of cap-
ital and non-capital prisoners. Prisoners serving a term of 
years have every incentive to seek judicial review as soon 
as possible. The capital inmate's incentive is just the 
opposite -- delay in any way possible. 'r 
6. Standards for Competency: The Committee believes 
that the proposal will be more attractive to the States if 
the standards for appointing counsel are flexible. Differ-
ent States may need different schemes for qualification and 





program as a whole is a federal question subject to review 
by a federal court. 
7. Ineffective Assistance Claims: Ineffective assist-
ance of habeas counsel is not itself a ground for relief 
1.....__ _ __,, ,._,, 
under the proposal, and should not be. 
does provide any right to counsel 




review. Murray v. Giarratano. The Commit tee did not be-
lieve creation of such a new right to effective assistance 
was appropriate. This would open a new ground for collater-
al litigation and delay. The competency of counsel is best 
addressed in the State's system for appointment, not in in-
dividual cases . 
• 
,~ 
lfp/ss 09/19/89STATE SALLY-POW 
Judicial Conference 
September 20, 1989 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
AD HOC COMMITTEE REPORT 
The Chief Justice suggested that I make a 
brief statement about the work of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital 
Cases. The Chief Justice created this Committee 
in June 1988, and asked me to chair it. 
Other members of the Committee were Chief 
Judges Charles Clark and Paul Roney, and District 
Judges Terry Hodges of Florida and Barefoot 
Sanders of Texas. Each of these judges serves in 
the Fifth or Eleventh Circuits, whose States have 
the greatest numbers of prisoners under capital 
sentence. 
Professor Al Pearson of the University of 
Georgia Law School, who has had experience 
representing defendants in capital cases, served 
as Reporter. Bill Burchill of the Administrative 
Office served as Secretary. 
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The Committee's Report, dated August 23, 
with drafts of proposed legislation, has been sent 
to each of you. In view of the mass of papers 
members of the Conference have to consider, it may 
be helpful if I comment briefly on the problem and 
what the Committee recommends. 
I think you will all agree that the 
present system of post-conviction review in 
capital cases is unsatisfactory. It neither 
provides sufficient protections for prisoners nor 
adequately recognizes the states' interest in 
finality. The hard fact is that the laws of 37 
states are not being enforced by the courts. 
About 20,000 murders are committed in our 
country each year. Only a fraction of the worst 
murderers - even those convicted - are sentenced 
to die. 
There are now approximately 2,200 
convicted murderers on death row awaiting 
execution. Since the Supreme Court's 1972 Furman 
decision only 116 executions have taken place. 
The average length of time between conviction and 
execution has been more than eight years. Delay 
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of this magnitude is hardly necessary for fairness 
or for thorough review. 
A major problem with the present system 
is the need for qualified counsel to represent 
indigent prisoners at all stages. As you know, 
the Constitution requires counsel for the trial 
and direct review. A new federal statute requires 
appointment of counsel on federal habeas in 
capital cases. But his leaves a serious gap in 
some state collateral systems. 
Another aspect of the present system 
causes related problems. In most states the 
setting of an execution date now provides the only 
incentive for the condemned prisoner to initiate 
post-conviction review. As a result, nothing 
happens until a date is set. Then counsel is 
appointed or found, and urgent efforts are made to 
stay execution. 
Capital litigation is distinctly 
different from other criminal cases. Typically, 
there are long periods of inactivity, followed by 
hurried eleventh hour activity. This last-minute 
litigation does not comport with the sober and 
deliberate review that is appropriate. 
I respect those who argue for outright 
abolition of death punishment. But it seems 
irrational to retain the penalty, and frustrate 
its fair implementation. 
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The Committee proposes new statutory 
procedures that would apply in capital cases. Of 
course, Congress is free to legislate with respect 
to review of state convictions by federal habeas 
corpus. Habeas corpus for state prisoners is not 
mentioned in the Constitution. It was created by 
Congress by statute in 1867. 
Separate procedures are appropriate for 
capital litigation because it is unique. The 
incentives facing a capital defendant differ from 
those facing the ordinary prisoner. The prisoner 
serving a term seeks speedy review. But delay is 
the objective of one sentenced to death. 
The aim of our proposal is this: 
Capital cases should be subject to one fair and 
complete course of collateral review through the 
state and federal systems. This review should be 
free from the time pressure of an impending 
execution and with the assistance of competent 
counsel for the prisoner. When this review has 
concluded, litigation should end. 
5. 
This proposal would not be binding on a 
state. It would allow a State to elect to bring 
collateral litigation, involving its capital 
prisoners, within the scope of the new statute. A 
state could do this by providing competent counsel 
in state post-conviction review. 
The proposal would reduce unnecessary 
delay by providing a time limit on the filing of 
federal habeas petitions. The time limit would 
have tolling rules that ensure ample time for the 
presentation and consideration of all claims. 
Finality would be enhanced by limiting the 
circumstances in which federal relief may be 
sought after one full course of litigation up to 
the Supreme Court. 
In addition to competent counsel, the new 
proposal provides other measures to protect the 
rights of prisoners. An automatic stay of 
execution is provided during the course of review 
to eliminate time pressure. And the certificate 
of probable cause is eliminated to provide for 
automatic review by the Court of Appeals. 
Two members of the Conference have 
expressed some concern about two aspects of our 
proposal. I say a few words about each. 
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First, the proposal limits subsequent and 
successive applications for federal habeas relief 
to claims of innocence of the crime itself. It 
does not allow the prisoner to use a repeat 
petition to challenge the sentence alone. 
In my view, this provision, in §2257(c), 
is vital to providing finality. Allowing 
repetitive challenges to the sentence would be far 
different from providing an exception for claims 
of innocence. 
Unlike evidence about the crime, which 
turns on historical fact, mitigating evidence - as 
this Court has held - can be unlimited. It may 
include speculation and facts only dimly 
remembered. New "expert" witnesses are easy to 
find. 
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It has been suggested that not allowing 
an exception to challenge the sentence where the 
state has withheld evidence of mitigation, would 
run counter to Brady v. Maryland. But meritorious 
claims of withholding sentencing evidence are 
extremely rare. 
Our proposal gives the prisoner counsel 
and an automatic stay for one full course of 
review. It is fair to require any challenge to 
the sentence to be raised at this time. 
A second concern mentioned is that the 
180 day limitations period is too short. The 
period includes only time when no litigation is 
taking place, and the period starts to run only 
when a lawyer is appointed. 
There also is a provision for a 60-day 
extension when necessary. The prisoner will have 
assistance of counsel. The time for preparation 
is therefore ample. 
I note that, although there has been no 
serious time limit on habeas in the past, the 
180-day period is far longer than afforded for 
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taking any type of state or federal appeal, 
including cert petitions. 
In conclusion, I note that the 
fundamental requirement of a justice system is 
fairness in individual cases. Where the death 
penalty is involved this means a searching and 
impartial review of the propriety of the sentence. 
Fairness also requires that if a 
prisoner's claims are found to be without merit, 
society is entitled to have a lawful penalty 
carried out without unreasonable delay. 
I thank the Conference for allowing me to 
present this Report. Our reporter Professor Al 
Pearson, is here. He deserves much of the credit 
for the careful drafting of the proposed new 
statutes. My law clerk, Hewitt Pate, also 
attended all six of the Committee meetings, and 
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Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
STATEMENT OF JUSTICE POWELL 
The Chief Justice suggested that I make a 
brief statement about the work of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital 
Cases, and the Report that we have submitted to 
the Judicial Conference. The Chief Justice 
created this Committee in June, 1988, and asked me 
to chair it. 
The Conference received the Committee 
Report yesterday, and decided to release the 
Report to the public. The Conference deferred 
final action on the Report until its March 
meeting • 
This Report concerns procedures allowing 
post-conviction challenges to state criminal 
convictions in federal court. These procedures 




are not required by the Constitution. They were 
created by Congress in 1867, and Congress is of 
course free to alter them. In brief summary, 
habeas corpus is a procedure by which a prisoner 
convicted in state court may challenge his 
conviction and sentence in federal court by 
claiming that it violated the Constitution. 
This federal review takes place after the 
direct appeal of the conviction to the state 
supreme court, and often after a petition for 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. 
Each State also has its own habeas corpus 
procedures, and prisoners are required to seek 
state habeas relief before moving to federal 
court. Our Committee was formed to study the 
application of the habeas corpus system in cases 
involving the death penalty . 
The Committee sought the views of a 
number of groups interested in capital punishment. 
Although there was disagreement as to what should 
be done, there was almost unanimous agreement that 
the present system is unsatisfactory. It neither 




adequately recognizes the public's interest in 
enforcement of the law. 
The hard fact is that the laws of 37 
States are not being enforced by the courts. 
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About 20,000 murders are committed in our country 
each year. Only a fraction of the worst murderers 
-- even those convicted -- are sentenced to die. 
There are now approximately 2,200 convicted 
murderers on death row awaiting execution. Since 
the Supreme Court's 1972 Furman decision only 116 
executions have taken place • . The average length 
of time between conviction and execution has been 
more than eight years. Delay of this magnitude is 
hardly necessary for fairness or for thorough 
review. 
A major problem with the present system 
is the need for qualified counsel to represent 
indigent prisoners at all stages. The 
Constitution requires counsel for the trial and 
direct review. A new federal statute requires 
appointment of counsel on federal habeas in 




state systems that do not provide counsel for 
post-conviction review. 
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Another aspect of the present system 
causes several difficulties. In most States the 
setting of an execution date now provides the only 
incentive for the condemned prisoner to initiate 
post-conviction review . 
As a result, nothing happens until a date 
is set. Then counsel is appointed or found, and 
urgent efforts are made to stay execution. 
Capital litigation is therefore distinctly 
different from other criminal cases. Typically, 
there are long periods of inactivity, followed by 
hurried eleventh-hour activity. This last-minute 
litigation does not comport with the careful and 
deliberate review that is appropriate. 
I respect those who argue for outright 
abolition of death punishment. But it seems 
irrational to retain the penalty, and frustrate 
its fair implementation. 
Separate habeas corpus procedures are 
appropriate for capital litigation because it is 




differ from those facing the ordinary prisoner. 
The prisoner serving a term seeks speedy review. 
But delay is the objective of one sentenced to 
death. 
The aim of our proposal is this: 
Capital cases should be subject to one fair and 
complete course of collateral review through the 
state and federal systems. 
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This review should be free from the time 
pressure of an impending execution and with the 
assistance of competent counsel for the prisoner. 
When this review has concluded, litigation should 
end . 
This proposal is optional. It would not 
be binding on a State. It would allow a State to 
elect to bring collateral litigation involving its 
capital prisoners within the scope of the new 
statute. A State could do this by providing 
competent counsel in state post-conviction review. 
The proposal would reduce unnecessary 
delay by providing a time limit on the filing of 





have tolling rules that ensure ample time for the 
presentation and consideration of all claims. 
Finality would be enhanced by limiting the 
circumstances in which federal relief may be 
sought after one full course of litigation up to 
the Supreme Court . 
In addition to competent counsel, the new 
proposal provides other measures to protect the 
rights of prisoners. For example, an automatic 
stay of execution is provided during the entire 
course of review to eliminate time pressure. 
In conclusion, I note that the 
fundamental requirement of a justice system is 
fairness in individual cases. Where the death 
penalty is involved this means a searching and 
impartial review of the propriety of the sentence. 
Fairness also requires that if a prisoner's claims 
are found to be without merit, society is entitled 
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This review should be free from the time 
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assistance of competent counsel for the prisoner. 
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• If I were a State legislator, I would vote against capital punishment. But 72% of the American public don't agree with this 
view. As a judge, I recognize that capital punishment is the law 
in 37 states. Federal law also provides for capital punishment 
in certain cases. The Supreme Court has consistently held that 
capital punsishment is constitutionally permissible. Of course, 
because capital punishment is irreversible, the Court and society 
have recognized that safeguards are required to ensure that the 
penalty is enforced with the utmost reliability and fariness . 
• But our present system for the judicial review of capital cases 
simply isn't working. It neither provides adequate safeguards 
for prisoners nor recognizes society's interest in the finality 
of criminal judgments. 
Our present system allows state prisoners who have already 
appealed their convictions to their state supreme court and to 
the United States Supreme Court to continue challenging their 
convictions by petitions for habeas corpus. Habeas corpus 
• provides a valuable safeguard of constitutional rights, and many 
• trial court errors have been found during habeas corpus proceedings. But under current law, there is no time limit on 
how long a prisoner may wait before challenging his sentence. If 
the prisoner faces a death sentence, he has no incentive to begin 
litigation until an execution date is set. Moreover, there is no 
serious limit on the number of petitions that a prisoner may 
file. It is common for a prisoner in a capital case to file two, 
three, or more habeas petitions. A case may be reviewed by the 
Supreme Court five or more times . 
• Not surprisingly, this system of unlimited review has led to 
lengthy delays in capital cases. There are now approximately 
2,200 convicted murderers on death row awaiting execution. Since 
the Supreme Court's 1976 decisions upholding capital sentencing 
statutes, only 118 executions have taken place. The average 
length of time between conviction and execution has been more 
than eight years. Delay of this magnitude is hardly necessary 
for fairness or for thorough review. In many cases, the system 
• 
• is being used not for protection of prisoners' rights, but to produce delay for its own sake. 
During the past year, I have served as chairman of a 
committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States that 
was formed to consider post-conviction review in capital cases. 
Both federal and state judicial systems allow prisoners to 
challenge their conviction and sentence through petitions for 
• habeas corpus. Federal habeas corpus is available to prisoners 
after they have completed direct appeals to their state supreme 
court and the United States Supreme Court, and then sought 
further post conviction remedies in the state system, perhaps 
with another trip to state and federal supreme courts. Federal 
habeas corpus remedies for state prisoners are not a part of the 
Constitution. They were created by Congress in 1867, and 
Congress is free to alter them. In capital case 
• 
• I respect the views of those who call for the abolition of capital punishment. But it seems irrational to retain the 
penalty and frustrate its fair implementation. 
Some critics, including the Washington Post, have taken the 
view that the chaos and delay of the present system is desirable 
because it undermines imposition of a penalty of which they do 
not approve. This type of argument is simply not consistent with 
the ideal of a government based on the rule of law . 
• 
• 
